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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT L. nlcnlULLIN,
Appellant and Plaintvff,

vs.

Case No.
8998

LYNvVOOD F. SHIMMIN and JACQUIE
A. SHIMMIN,
Respondents and Defendants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 20, 1958, defendants executed an Earnest
Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase on the standard
fonn approved by the Utah State Securities Commission
and the Salt Lake Real Estate Board for the purchase
of real property. Plaintiff accepted this offer by ~igning
it that same day.
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Plaintiff alleges that defendants breached the terms
of this agreement in April, 1958, by not going forward
with said purchase. Defendants deny any liability under
the agreement for various reasons set forth in their
answer. Defendants paid plaintiff the sum of $100.00 at
the time the document referred to above was executed,
and plaintiff has never returned or offered to return
this money to defendants. On niay 21, 1958, plaintiff
brought an action for specific performance of the aforesaid agreement and prayed in the alternative for damages
for breach of contract in the event specific performance
was not granted and for attorney's fees for enforcement of the contract in either case. On August 15, 1958,
plaintiff sold the property in question to Elmer and Elma
Klitgaard. At a pre-trial hearing held on Kovember 7,
1958, Judge A. H. Ellett disn1issed plaintiff's complaint

with prejudice for the reason that plaintiff did not return nor offer to return to defendant the earnest money
deposit referred to above prior to the connnencement
of this proceeding. On N ove1nber 1-!, 1958, plaintiff filed
a motion to alter judg1nent. Plaintiff's motion was denied
by the Honorable A. I-I. Ellett on Decmnber 1, 1958,
on the grounds that plaintiff could not 111aintain an action
for dmnages after selling the subject property to a third
person after counnencing an action for specific perfornmnce or for dmuages in the alternative.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE

PRE-TRIAL JUDGE

ERRED

IN

DISMISSING

PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE AT THE
PRE-TRIAL HELD ON NOVEMBER 7, 1958.
POINT II
THE PRE-TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN NOT GRANTING
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ALTER JUDGMENT.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE

PRE-TRIAL JUDGE

ERRED

IN

DISMISSING

PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE AT THE
PRE-TRIAL HELD ON NOVEMBER 7, 1958.

The issue here is whether a seller nmst restore consideration paid as a deposit on a contract to purchase
real property in order to elect to enforce the contract
upon buyer's breach by an action for specific performance or in the alternative for darnages. In the case of
Andreason vs. Hansen, ____________ Utah ------------, 335 P (2d)
404, it was held that the failure to return the deposit
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on an earnest 1noney agreement precluded a subsequent
action for damages since the amount had thereby become
liquidated at the election of the seller. No such election,
however, could be claimed where the action commenced
is one for specific performance. In the Andreason case,
the successful buyers-appellants' brief stated as follows:
"The cases clearly hold that where there is a provision
for liquidated dainages in a contract for the sale of
real property, the fact that such a provision exists does
not eliminate the right of seller to require specific perfonnance of the contract rather than accept his other
available rmnedy, that is liquidated damages." (P

±, 5).

The pre-trial judge recognized this by stating at the
conclusion of the proceedings of Decmnber 1, 1958, as
follows: "I wasn't aware that the matter was for specific
perfonnance, nor was I aware that the land had been
sold on N ovmnber 7th. I had assu1ned it was an action
for da1nages, and, of course, the Andreason case in my
opinion would apply only to dalnages and not to specific
perfonuance actions" (R 23). Therefore, there was not
and could not be an election in this

c~se

at the time

this snit was connnenced to retain the deposit as liquidatl'd and agreed damages rather than to enforce the
agreen1en t.
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POINT II
THE PRE-TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN NOT GRANTING
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO ALTER JUDGMENT.

The first issue here is whether a seller who commences an action for specific performance and in the
alternative for damages is precluded fron1 obtaining the
latter remedy when he sells the property between the
time the action is commenced and the case tried.
Rule 8 (a) provides that relief in the alternative or of
several different types n1ay be demanded. Rule 8( e) (2)
provides that a party may set forth as n1any separate
claims as he has regardless of consistency and whether
based on legal or on equitable grounds or both. In the
case of Pverson vs. Dorff, 223 NvV 579, 198 Wise. 43
(1929), the vendee brought an action to recover $500.00
earnest money paid vendor pursuant to alleged breach
of real estate contract. Vendor counter-clain1ed for
specific performance and thereafter moved to amend his
complaint by pleading a counter-claim for damages based
on vendee's breach. The court there said: "It is equally
clear that the remedy of specific performance and that
prosecuted to recover damages are not inconsjstent
remedies, because both are based upon the contraet. ...
the mere commencement or pendency of one will not bar
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the other or defeat the action." That case cited this
language from Conwihan vs. Thompson, 111 l\{ass. 270:
"'The remedy in equity by compelling specific performance and that at law in damages for breach are both in
affirmance of the contract. They are alternative remedies
but not inconsistent, and remedy in both forms might
be sought in one and the same action."
The Wisconsin case cited above concluded: "From
the foregoing it conclusively appears that the equitable
rernedy for specific performance and the legal remedy
to recover damages are not inconsistent, especially where
the action to recover damages is prosecuted after the
abandonment of a plea for specific perforn1ance.''
Even if the remedies of specific perfonnance and
damages are considered inconsistent, n1any courts have
held that the commencen1ent of a suit is not a conclusive election and none occurs until plaintiff receives
son1e benefit or defendant is caused some detriment
thereby. 28 C.J.S. 1090
~l,his

court in the case of Salt Lake City

L'S.

Industrial

CoJnmiss,ion, 17 P (2d) 239, cited the following language

of 9 R.C.L. 960 with approval: "An election of a remedy
which has the effect of an estoppel in pais or an estoppel
by reeord in that class of cases in which the rmnedies
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are really inconsistent is generally considered rnade
when an action has been commenced on one of such
remedies. Some courts go so far as to say that in such
cases the choice of rmnedy once made can not be withdrawn or reconsidered though no advantage has been
gained nor injury done by setting the choice aside. But
the more reasonable rule is that the mere bringing of
an action which has been dismissed before judgment,
and in which no element of estoppel in pais has arisen,
that is, where no advantage has been gained or no
detriment has been occasioned, is not an election."
18 Am. J ur. 155 states the rule as applied to the type
of case in question as follows : "Parties to a contract
have a right to stand on the agreement as entered into
by them and may, in a proper case, invoke the aid of
the court for its specific enforcernent, or at their option
they may, upon breach of the contract, seek damages at
law. When they resort to one of these remedies, such
action may constitute an abandonment of the right to
invoke the other. On this ground, an action for damages
for breach of a contract has been held to bar a later suit
for specific performance of the sarne contract, even
though the first action was dismissed before judgment.
On the other hand, the beginning of a suit for specific
performance has been considered not such an election
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of renwdies as would bar a later action for damages
for breach of the contract, where the first proceeding
was discontinued before any advantage accrued to the
plaintiff or detriment resulted to the defendant." The
case of M eMahan v. M cM.ahan) 122 S.C. 336, 115 S.E.
293, 26 A.L.R. 1295, an action for brealic of realty sale
contract is cited as authority for that last statement of
law.
The crucial question is : If seller elects to enforce
a contract by commencing an action for specific performance, must he return any pay1nents n1ade by buyer
prior to or immediately after he resells the subject
property in order to pursue a re1nedy for dan1ages for
breach of contract when the dmnages exceed the amount
of such paJ!nents ~
As a practical 1natter it certainly would seem to
be desirable to encourage sellers to resell their property
after commencing an action for specific perfonnance
rather than compel an unwilling purchaser to buy a
house he does not want. Once the property has been
resold and it is ascertained that the seller's loss caused
by the buyPr's breach of contract is greater than the
auwunt received by hiln on account of the purchase price,
it would hardly seen1 reasonable to expect hiln to pay
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such lesser amount to the buyer in order that he might.
sue him for a larger amount. To do so would be so
inconsistent with the normal pattern of conduct that it
is not to be expected.
If the principle of the Andreason case is extended
to such a case as this where there was no overreaching,
no vengeance, no deceptive nets, there is a grave danger
that contracting parties will be deprived of the protection
of their written agreements by overlooking a seemingly
innocent provision there which appeared to be for their
benefit by neglecting to return to the party at fault
an insignificant amount and thereby falling into an unintended election of remedies, the result of which would
be as grossly unfair as the judgment reversed in the
Andreason case. It would appear to be a much more
desirable rule to consider the question of election as one
of fact rather than of law. Retention of the deposit is
substantial evidence of election but it should not be incontrovertible so as to make it a rule of law.
Was not the holding in the Andreason case a result
of the court's conscience being shocked that an attorney
would and could obtain a judgment totalling $2,350.00
when less than 24 hours elapsed between the time the
contract there was executed and the breach occurred in
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the absence of any evidence showing any Inaterial change
in the market within that brief period of time~ Should
not the rule in that case be limited to very similar facts
rather than given universal application in a case such
as this where more than four months elapsed between
the time defendants signed the agreement and the time
they indicated they would not go through with this sale~
Otherwise a just result in that case ·will probably result
in unjustifiable protection to contract breakers in the
future.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of dismissal of the District Court of
Salt Lake County should be vacated and the cause remanded to the District Court to ascertain whether a
valid agreement was entered into between plaintiff and
defendants, and if so, whether the latter are liable for
breach of the agreement, and if so, to enter judgment
accordingly, including reasonable attorney's fees.
Very respectfully sub1nitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney for Appellant
and

Plaint~ff

65 East 4th South
Salt Lake City, Utah
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